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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine how intelligence is gathered in the
Southern State Region, identify perceived gaps in the current policies used with this
communication and offer potential solutions to intelligence communication flaws. An
interview-based research of Southern State Region officers and agents and the support of
peer-reviewed academic articles shaped the research in this paper. The results of this
research indicated that (a) personal connections between law enforcement agents and
federal agents are the backbone of the current process utilized in information sharing, (b)
there are gaps when personnel leave their position in office because of the personal
connections that are used while in office, and (c) the fusion center in the Southern State
Region is a highly underutilized because of its lack of publicity and resources.
Implications for future research and practice are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the philosophy of intelligence
dissemination in the law enforcement community focused primarily on “operations
security,” in which intelligence information and records were not widely distributed
throughout law enforcement departments and federal agencies in order to prevent
information from being compromised. This preventative technique hindered
communication among law enforcement agencies and potentially jeopardized missions
throughout the country (Carter, 2009). September 11, 2001, was a breakpoint for
American protective agencies causing them to realize law enforcement communication
was less effective than terrorist communications (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013).
After September 11, 2001, practices of sharing information among federal agencies and
law enforcement departments began to change as the flaws of the “operations security”
tactic, or the actual operations, became evident. The general perspective on information
sharing has shifted to facilitate involving more people who know the information at hand;
therefore, the change in information sharing makes a plan to prevent attacks and threats
from reaching execution easier (Carter, 2009).
Despite the continuous changes in information sharing among organizations,
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many imperfections still exist when sharing intelligence among different levels of
law enforcement. The prevailing communication technique throughout the federal, state,
and local law enforcement agencies is personal connections (Cozine, Joyal, & Ors, 2014).
These personal connections facilitated easy dissemination of information among agents
of varying organizations in real time.
The inclusion of personal connection strategies brings a number of concerns or
limitations. Not every agent has established connections or has recognized that the other
branches of law enforcement could potentially assist in their investigation. The federal
intelligence community possesses a wealth of information to provide to local and state
law enforcement offices involving “analytic tradecraft, understanding the adversary,
national-level technical collection, and the like” (p. 16), which in turn can be reciprocated
with local law enforcement’s “on-the-ground” intelligence that is gathered daily that
federal agents lack (Jenkins, Liepman, & Willis, 2014). This collaboration is sometimes
overlooked when trying to complete an investigation because the agency has too narrow
of a focus
CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS FOR THE STUDY
In 1848, Karl Marx coined the social conflict theory through his writings of the
Communist Manifesto. Marx viewed society as being comprised of individuals and
groups who compete for social, political, and material resources. Some individuals and
organizations are able to obtain and preserve more resources than others (OpenStax
College, 2013). George Vold’s position on the conflict theory is “people are naturally
group orientated and may come together to form a group to push for their particular
interests in the political arena” (Pond, 1999, p. 72).
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Social conflict theory encompasses barriers when communicating with outside
organizations as a natural human tendency. According to Kenney (1956) the internal
communication barriers to police communication include fear and suspicions,
departmental status of individuals, officer attitude and behavior, etc. These barriers lead
to problems in communication throughout a police department. He noted the need for
communication within police departments, but also recognized the difficulty in
eliminating existing barriers (Kenney, 1956).
Social conflict theory can be identified in current research displaying its influence
on intelligence communication within law enforcement because resources have a
tendency to maintain within its organization. Intelligence-led policing after September
11, 2001 has become a major process according to Schaible and Sheffield’s research
(2011). They concluded that there is an increased involvement in homeland security
interactions among state and federal agencies which resulted in an increase in
intelligence-led policing at all levels. However, sharing resources among levels of law
enforcement has had little impact on interactions among agencies (Schaible & Sheffield,
2011). Despite these efforts to increase communication, interaction remains scarce among
agencies because of the parochialism that pervades law enforcement.
Most recently, Jackson (2014) studied efforts being taken to share information,
how information sharing has been evaluated, and the better ways of sharing information.
Jackson focused on how the interaction among agencies occurs and the hindrances
resulting from social conflict. In Jackson’s conclusions, he stated there is a lack of
literature evaluating information sharing in the United States since September 11, 2001
(Jackson, 2014). The need for analytic investments is important for future decisions;
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therefore, the justification for the current study is present.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The current study analyzes the different techniques that were implemented in
homeland security intelligence in order to increase communication among the local, state,
and federal levels of law enforcement after September 11, 2001. These techniques were
then used to help better understand communication impediments and remedy existing
communication barriers. At the time of the study, the communication process being used
to disseminate information and intelligence among these three levels lacked a fortified
structure for individuals to follow (Carter, Carter, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2017). The
modal platform for transferring information through organizations was personal
connections and lacked the structure of an actual program to guide its information
distribution (Cozine et al., 2014).
These personal communication techniques used to disseminate information at
government levels allows for the different agencies and departments to connect on a
straightforward basis but fail to consider some of the impediments, such as
declassification, that are jeopardizing intelligence sharing among different agencies
(Carter et al., 2017). Employees with different agencies are encouraged to share
information through databases and connections in order to disseminate intelligence
outside their own agency (Carter, 2009). However, gaps such as the lack of documented
contacts in different agencies and personnel changes are not considered when relying on
personal contact as a main source of gathering external intelligence.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
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The purpose of this study is to examine how intelligence is gathered in the
Southern State Region, discover the perceived gaps in the current policies and practices
used with this communication and provide potential solutions to intelligence
communication. The main focus of communication throughout the Southern State Region
is personal communication between one individual in an agency making contact and
connection with an individual in another agency in order to gather information and
intelligence pertinent to their investigation. These aspects are common in the Southern
State Region because of the small agency sizes throughout all three levels of law
enforcement and the close communication among agencies needed to better protect the
Southern State Region’s citizens.
The following research questions will guide the study:
1) How has intelligence dissemination among local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers changed since September 11, 2001?
2) What impediments, if any, in intelligence dissemination are perceived by
local, state, and federal law enforcement agents?
LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Generalization of the findings will be limited because only one location was used
and because of the qualitative nature of the research. The findings may be less definitive,
requiring the practitioners, rather than the researcher, to judge the applicability of the
findings. Merriam (1998), however, argued generalization is neither a strength nor goal
of qualitative research. Similarly, Patton believed the strongest argument for generalizing
is extrapolation, the “modest speculations on the likely applicability of findings to other
situations under similar, but not identical conditions” (1990, p. 489). Patton alleged
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extrapolation is broadly accepted by both qualitative researchers and the general public.
The methodology involves a non-probability purposive sample to insure the
participants will be uniquely suited for the intent of the study. A convenient sample
consisted of law enforcement officers employed within the area of the research and who
were available to answer questions in a reasonable timeframe. This method of sampling
has two potential sources of bias. Those who were in attendance at the conference did not
have an opportunity to be interviewed. Secondly, law enforcement officers who chose to
be interviewed, may have done so only because they may have strong unilateral
perceptions regarding intelligence dissemination among local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers.
The last limitation concerns the literature review. The review may not be
comprehensive which potentially impacted the manner in which the interview schedule
was designed and limits the synthesis of findings with current literature. Because research
on government intelligence sharing is generally restricted, the researcher was constrained
to gathering non-classified data. Finally, it is assumed that the respondents were honest in
their responses.
DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS
Significant terms used throughout this study are defined as follows:
Information: “raw data; it could be an item obtained from a newspaper report, a
statement made by a confidential informant, or simply an observation made by an astute
police officer during a traffic stop” (Palmieri, 2005, para 2).
Intelligence: “a product that consists of information that has been refined to meet
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the needs of policymakers; a process through which that information is identified,
collected, and analyzed” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017, para 9).
Communication: “the process of transmitting information and common
understanding from one person to another ” (Lunenburg, 2010, p. 1).
9/11 Commission Report: “an independent, bipartisan commission created by
congressional legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is
chartered to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate
response to the attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations
designed to guard against future attacks” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, para 1).
Need to know: “indicates that an individual requesting access to criminal
intelligence data has the need to obtain the data in order to execute official
responsibilities” (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013, p. 46).
SUMMARY
Communication among our country’s three levels of law enforcement has become
a topic of study since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Growing concerns
about barriers in our government’s communication skills are prevalent as different
situations continue to threaten the nation’s safety. The intelligence community has often
been criticized for miscommunication that could have potentially deterred the horrific
attacks on American soil in 2001. The implementation of the 9/11 Commission Report
and Fusion Centers across the country have provided guidelines and means to help bridge
the gap in intelligence sharing between local, state, and federal levels of law enforcement,
but most are still implemented through personal connections in the Southern State
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Region.
The following chapter examines literature focusing on the changes before and
after September 11, 2001, in the aspects of information and intelligence distribution
between local, state, and federal levels of law enforcement, as well as the implementation
of fusion centers and their effects on communication. Chapter three describes the
methodological design of the study. The population sampling and data collection
procedures are described, while also discussing the data analysis process and explaining
how the research questions were answered. Chapter four analyzes the data obtained in the
research. Finally, chapter five discusses future implications and research drawn from the
research data and previous studies.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
INTRODUCTION
The lack of intelligence dissemination prior to the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001 forced the country to realize its shortcomings with sharing information among
levels of law enforcement. Different agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), FBI, National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), etc.,
share the common goal of gathering information in order to reveal threats against the
United States. In Nacos’s (2016) book, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, one major flaw
was presented in the fact these agencies all see fragments of information that do not show
the overall situation, and if they collaborated the totality of the threat can potentially be
seen (Nacos, 2016). The missed opportunity to prevent the 9/11 attacks from occurring
was not based upon the lack of law enforcement knowledge but rather the bureaucratic
rules that governed the dissemination of information among law enforcement agencies at
different levels (German & Stanley, 2007; Nacos, 2016).
Throughout the country, many scholars and lawmakers have tried to address the
problem of information sharing. Since September 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission Report
has been implemented in order to further information sharing across levels of law
enforcement and regional fusion centers have been created to help facilitate this
cooperation.
Information is defined as raw unanalyzed data that pertains to persons, events,
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evidence, etc. on cases that are being investigated. This information can be gathered by
numerous levels of law enforcement that then have to be shared amongst the
organizations. Raw data can come from sources such as wiretaps, informants, interviews,
banking records, criminal records, surveillance, etc. (Carter, 2004). These pieces of
information are being shared across levels of law enforcement which aids in case
completion.
Information can be sensitive and protected to different levels of classification.
According to Quist (para 2 ,1993), “top secret” information applies to information that is
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security if inappropriately
disclosed, which includes information such as intelligence operations, scientific
developments towards national security, etc. “Secret” classification applies to
information that can cause serious damage to national security, which includes
indications of weaknesses in equipment or capabilities, etc. “Confidential” classification
applies to information that can cause damage to national security, which includes
technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection (Quist, 1993).
Finally, “law enforcement sensitive” classification applies to information that is sensitive
but unclassified in which its disclosure could jeopardize law enforcement investigations
(Hamilton, para 4, 2017). Information is classified in order to protect the people
conducting the investigation, the methods in which they are gathered, and the information
itself (Carter, 2004).
In addition to the policies and practices that the government has implemented
through the 9/11 Commission Report and fusion centers, this study was guided by (a) the
pre-9/11 shortcomings in information sharing; (b) the post-9/11 changes in information
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sharing; (c) fusion center formation and its impact on intelligence sharing nationwide;
and (d) the need for information sharing in order to ensure national security, how it is
orchestrated, and challenges faced.
Pre-9/11 Shortcomings in Information Sharing
Collaboration among levels of law enforcement before the 9/11 attacks made
distinct separations between traditional crimes and counterterrorism crimes. This
separation between crimes led to lack of communication among organizations who faced
these offenses. According to Carter (2009), one of the main reasons information was not
disseminated properly to every organization was the concern that critical information
would fall into possession of the wrong individual. The potential misguidance of
information could jeopardize cases as well as undercover officers, informants, and
collection methods, which led to the reluctance to share information outside of one’s
agency. The process of “operations security” allowed for the possibility of organizations
to possess overlapping information on individuals that were connected without the
knowledge of the other’s investigation.
September 11, 2001 was a watershed moment in American law enforcement
history (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013). The lack of communication between the
federal government and lower levels of law enforcement became prevalent. The terrorists
who orchestrated the attacks on 9/11 all had criminal records that had been intercepted by
various law enforcement agencies. Records such as traffic violations and fraudulent
driver’s licenses brought the terrorists on law enforcement radar; however, without a
formal information sharing process, the federal government was unaware of their
criminal history before their attacks on that fatal day (Council of State, 2005). The federal
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government’s post-attack analysis determined that enough information was available
from theses criminal records to have detained the individuals before their attack on
American soil (Dodson, 2007).
The shortcomings in intelligence sharing revealed by 9/11 terrorist attacks created
the pathway to new techniques in intelligence collaboration and brought the country into
its current information sharing focus. The September 11, 2001, attacks led the
government to issue the 9/11 Commission Report and fusion centers to better facilitate
communication between federal, state, and local levels of law enforcement and
implement new procedures to help the process work more smoothly across all levels.
Post-9/11 Changes in Information Sharing
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, changes began to occur throughout the
intelligence and law enforcement communities to prevent these kind of attacks from
reoccurring. The importance of intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing tools
improved after the terrorist attacks in order to further cooperation among all levels of law
enforcement (Council of State, 2005). The 9/11 Commission Report was brought into
effect on August 3, 2007 by President George W. Bush (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2008). The 9/11 Commission Report recommended an information sharing
environment between local, state, and federal levels and made numerous
recommendations related to intelligence dispersal (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2008; Carter, 2009).
Carter (2009) stated that the 9/11 Commission Report encouraged “cooperative
relationships, integration of intelligence functions, and a general reengineering of the
intelligence community were at the heart of their recommendations” (Carter, 2009, p. 43).

19

The sharing of information and working with organizations, such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s (FBI) Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), should improve
communication among local, state, and federal employees when working towards a
common enemy from different criminal records (Carter, 2009). The 9/11 Commission
Report recognized the heightened necessity and importance for infusing different levels
of law enforcement such as seen in JTTFs and resulted in 66 JTTFS around the nation.
The shift in focus seen with the heightened use of JTTFs throughout the country shows
the FBI’s transition from its majority concern for traditional crime to a reshaping of
priorities to “protect the United States from terrorist attacks” (Council of State, 2005, p.
20). These shifts in the FBI are occurring throughout the United States in order to
implement the newfound need to communicate among differing levels of law
enforcement agencies.
Another advancement implemented after the 9/11 attacks was the National
Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). The NCISP implemented in 2003 was
designed to provide a method for forming well-established partnerships among the three
levels of law enforcement in which actionable intelligence products could be created
from. The NCISP highlighted the importance of sharing among these government
agencies in order to prevent future terrorism and other criminal activity (Bureau of
Justice Assistance, 2013). Within the guidelines of the NCISP, the fusion center idea was
developed and funded in order to further the structure of communication and intelligence
sharing (Dodson, 2007). After the implementation of government plans like the 9/11
Commission Report and NCISP, intelligence and information sharing throughout the
country continued to increase and change with the creation of fusion centers.
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Fusion Center Formation and Its Impact on Intelligence Sharing Nationwide
According to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, a fusion center is defined as a:
collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal
government agencies that combines resources, expertise, and information
with the goal of maxing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent,
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 4)
Fusion centers provide comprehensive and appropriate network access, data analysis, and
information dissemination that is not seen in another single place (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2017). Employees consist of local law enforcement and other local
government employees, including the Department of Homeland Security personnel and
the FBI. Multiple agency representation allows for easy collaboration on site (Kayyali,
2014).
After September 11, 2001, the need for better communication techniques
throughout the government was largely put into focus. The FBI tried to increase their
JTTF intelligence sharing but there was still something missing for the state and local
levels in this federally-based government group. Beginning in 2003, fusion centers began
to be implemented throughout the country in order to spread the communication of
intelligence throughout the country (German & Stanley, 2007). State and local entities are
responsible for establishing, managing, and controlling fusion centers which render the
fusion centers susceptible to political and legal constraints inside each state's respective
jurisdiction (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
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The development of fusion centers across the nation is a direct result from
needing improved, more unified information from all three levels of law enforcement that
pertains to suspects, locations, and transportations that may be tied to criminal activities,
such as terrorist attacks (Dodson, 2007). Fusion centers orchestrate the core function of
collaboration and are an effective tool that maximizes relationship building and provides
available resources from multiple agencies at once (Carter, 2009). As Secretary Michael
Chertoff said in his address to the National Fusion Center Conference:
Ultimately, what we want to do is not create a single [fusion center], but a
network of [centers] all across the country, a network which is visible not
only to us at the federal level, but as important, if not more important
visible to each of you working in your own communities so you can
leverage all the information gathered across the country to help you carry
out your very important objectives. (Rollins, 2008, p. 9)
Fusion centers are intended to fill the voids among local, state, and federal laws
enforcement in an attempt to secure domestic cohesion and national security from all
levels of law enforcement. They serve as a location in which both civilian and sworn
personnel from a myriad of agencies at the three levels of law enforcement can interact
with one another (Cozine et al., 2014).
There are many different examples of fusion centers. Arizona’s Counter
Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) was one of the first fusion centers to be created
after the attacks on September 11, 2001. ACTIC is nationally recognized for its ability to
provide tactical and strategic intelligence to support state law enforcement offices and is
located with the FBI’s JTTF. The Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center
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(UNYRIC) is a multi-agency center that collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence
to New York City and 54 surrounding counties. UNYRIC is comprised of people from
many departments including the New York National Guard, The Office of Homeland
Security, NY state police and etc. (Council of State, 2005). These two examples show
that every fusion center does not have the same makeup, location, or purpose in order to
ensure national security and enhance collaboration between all levels of law enforcement.
Fusion centers were created to support and serve their local departments’ needs in the
area which gives them their purpose, rather than focusing on the federal or the
Washington intelligence community (Jenkins, Liepman, & Willis, 2014).
One of the fusion centers’ main roles is to contribute to government agencies and
law enforcement departments in order to aid communication which make fusion centers
vital to the American society. The presumptions that led these roles are: (a) intelligence
and the process of intelligence are vital roles in preventing terrorist actions; (b) in order
to create a comprehensive threat picture, fusion of a wider range of data is necessary; (c)
local and state law enforcement are in a unique position that helps them make
observations and collect information that could aid the main focus of threat assessments;
and (d) sub-federal level actions help benefit state and local departments and can
potentially aid national security (Rollins, 2008; Carter, 2009). Local police departments
are better suited to collect certain types of domestic intelligence, such as the criminal
records of the terrorists involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks. Local intelligence
collection makes fusion centers necessary to aid the dissemination of local intelligence to
their federal counterparts (Jenkins, Liepman, & Willis, 2014).
The creation of fusion centers has made the ideology of information sharing very
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prominent in the three levels of law enforcement to prevent another terrorist attack on
American soil. Information sharing take many forms which the next section of this
chapter will discuss the methodologies used most frequently.
The Need for Information Sharing to Ensure National Security, How It is
Orchestrated, and Challenges Faced
Sharing information among the three levels of law enforcement is imperative in
order to ensure the safety of the American public at all levels. The changes seen from
before September 11, 2001, to after the attacks and the organization of regional fusion
centers helps maintain the focus of information sharing. The practice of information
sharing has changed in how it is viewed by government agencies and police departments
in their willingness to share amongst themselves, but there are still many challenges in
their collaboration.
One of the main features of information sharing that changed after the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks was the change from “need to know” to “need/responsibility to
share” (Rollins, 2008; Dodson, 2007). Before September 11, 2001, government agencies
and police departments saw the action of sharing information as a potential detriment that
could potentially compromise the safety of the information and the actual case it
pertained to. Despite the change in philosophy, there is still a “need to know” influence
on the dissemination of information to external agencies. Rules for dissemination of
evidence are: (a) the protection of the civil rights of individuals, and (b) the preservation
of operational security. In these instances, while most officers have the right to know
information because of the status obtained through their job, not all officers have a “need
to know” which is based on their direct involvement requiring this information (Carter,
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2009, p. 69).
Information collaboration flows from many different agencies and departments in
order to work effectively. Employees of the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
National Sheriffs’ Association, FBI, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and etc. are all part of the information sharing
process that helps aid in the protection of America (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013, p.
6). Over sixty percent of agencies at the state level have local agencies request assistance
in aiding their intelligence gathering process through high-tech/computer crime
investigations and general training to help their intelligence processes in the future. FBI’s
JTTFs have helped build key relationships and have promoted intelligence sharing across
jurisdictional boundaries (Council of State, 2005).
Three main types of information sharing occur through this intergovernmental
process of fusion centers. Cross-domain information sharing focuses on the sharing of
data between different clearances across different networks. Cross-organization
information sharing focuses on providing inter-agency, sensitive and or classified data
through different organizational systems. Disconnected information sharing concentrates
on sharing sensitive and classified information to disconnect devices (Dodson, 2007).
The National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) focuses on cross-domain intelligence
sharing among different levels of law enforcement, whether local law enforcement or
federal emergency service agencies, and brings together key domains and communities of
interest between all levels (Carter, 2009).
Despite the attempts to aid information and intelligence sharing throughout the
levels of law enforcement in the United States, challenges are often seen with this type of
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dissemination. Being proactive, overstepping boundaries, and declassification plague the
idea of intelligence dissemination between levels of law enforcement in the United States
(Carter, 2009). Declassification is a serious problem with intelligence dissemination
because of its long, tedious process which cannot be easily shortened and creates
boundaries and detracts from the desired proactiveness.
Historically, law enforcement intelligence collection tends to be reactive side
rather than a proactive tactic that prevents the criminal actions from being completed
(Carter, 2009). According to local and state officials, the federal agencies still distribute
information on a reactive response when it comes to their jurisdiction. Federal agencies
are not proactive in initiating connections with fusion centers (Rollins, 2008). It is a
challenge for the intelligence community to be fully proactive because of the
unforeseeable actions of individuals that could potentially change the outcome.
Another overarching issue that plagues the intelligence community’s
collaboration is the potential overstepping of boundaries in the public’s eye. German and
Stanley’s (2007) phrase it eloquently in stating that the government’s actions to better
information sharing is indeed needed after the September 11, 2001, attacks, but
information about American citizens should be handled with the utmost care in order to
keep non-threatening individuals off of the “suspicious” persons list for federal agencies
(German & Stanley, 2007, p 3). With the collaboration of numerous organizations from
every level of government, the fusion center’s intelligence gathering processes are not
under one set of rules. As a result, “policy shopping”, or picking and choosing which set
of laws individuals are under at the time of collection, plays a big role in fusion centers
overstepping their boundaries (German & Stanley, 2007, p 10). The actions of fusion
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centers is vital to protection, but the regulations for these centers need to be delineated in
order to keep citizens safe from over collection and unnecessary intrusion.
One last formidable challenge with information sharing among the three different
levels of law enforcement is the policy of classification and declassification. Most of the
information obtained by the federal government is classified and unavailable to state and
local officials because of their lack of security clearances. The federal government’s
process of declassifying information in order to disseminate it to local and state officers is
something that is extremely difficult to achieve and takes a tremendous amount of time to
complete. Most state and local department complain about receiving a “substantial
amount of information”, but none pertaining to the “right information” needed for their
case (German & Stanley, 2007, p 20). The fragmentation of law enforcement in the
United States has almost made it impossible to disseminate information among agencies
in a timely manner. Each level of government can only operate with the “authority
granted to them by their constituency” (Cozine, Joyal, & Ors, 2014, p. 119). Security
clearances are difficult to obtain, but are necessary to keep information pertinent to the
safety of the country, but the problems posed by the classification of information are
prominent when trying to circulate information through the three levels of law
enforcement.
SUMMARY
Many changes have been realized since the September 11, 2001 attacks relating to
information and intelligence sharing throughout the three levels of law enforcement. The
creation of fusion centers has aided information sharing between different governmental
agencies. Despite their many challenges, fusion centers’ main focus is to provide a

27

consolidated facility for agencies and departments to collaborate on cases their
organizations are working from different perspectives in pursuit of a total picture. After
the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the government realized their mistake in not
coordinating previous knowledge of the terrorists prior to the attacks. Both of the
presented research questions focused on the changes in intelligence dissemination after
September 11, 2001 and the gaps that remain in the dissemination of intelligence in the
United States’ law enforcement community.
Many academic articles have been published on the intelligence community and
the problems faced before September 11, 2001 and how fusion centers have aided or
hindered the process of collaboration (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013; Carter, 2009;
Council of State, 2005; German, & Stanley, 2007; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2008). Every respondent in the interview process had heard of and/or used the
fusion center located in the Southern State Region and agree changes have been
implemented throughout the intelligence community since the September 11, 2001,
attacks. Their knowledge and firsthand interactions with other organizations were
considered when answering the interview questions, however, personal recommendations
or personal opinions on the intelligence process were ommitted in order to focus on the
actual process and not an individual’s bias.
Interpersonal connections are a focal point in the dissemination of intelligence
throughout the levels of law enforcement in the United States. Trust is one of the main
considerations in whether or not information is distributed to another organization or not
because the lack of trust jeopardizes the protection of information from external entities
(Cozine et al., 2014). A formal policy, plan, and procedure is recommended by academic
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articles in order to protect agencies and the information being transferred between
organizations (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013).
Chapter Three provides an overview of the research design and methodology for
the study. The methodological design of the study is explained in relation to the research
questions. The sampling method and data collection methods described, as well as the
data analysis tools used for the study. The fourth chapter examined the data gathered
from the survey, analysis methods, and results of data analysis. Finally, the fifth chapter
discussed the survey’s findings, implications of the study, and future research about the
topic.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
Although there is a tremendous amount of research conducted on the effects
September 11, 2001 had on communication techniques throughout the levels of law
enforcement, the current knowledge on how communication has changed on a daily basis
is still in its infancy. This study relied on the perceptions of local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers who have disseminated intelligence among the agencies since
September 11, 2001. This chapter specifically details the study’s: (a) methodology, (b)
population and sample, (c) data collection and instrumentation, and (d) data analysis.
The research questions that guided this study include:
1) How has intelligence dissemination among local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers changed since September 11, 2001?
2) What impediments, if any, in intelligence dissemination are perceived by
local, state, and federal law enforcement agents?
Population and Sample
The present study used the transcripts of interview questions that provided a wide
range of information pertaining to the intelligence dissemination process among local,
state, and federal law enforcement agencies. The participants were selected by a nonprobability, purposive sample. Non probability sampling is “any sampling procedure that
violates the Equal Probability of Selection Method,” meaning that every law enforcement
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agent did not possess the same probability of being selected (Hagan, 2018, p. 103). The
purposive sampling used in this study was the technique of snowball sampling. Purposive
sampling is “the selection of the sample based on the researcher’s skill, judgment, and
needs” (Hagan, 2018, p. 103). Snowball sampling “entails obtaining a first subject and on
the basis of this subject obtains entrée and introduction to other subjects” (Hagan, 2018,
p. 107). The original point of contact provided the information pertaining to another
agent or officer that could provide firsthand experience and knowledge concerning the
interview questions.
Participants for this study were selected based on their familiarization with the
intelligence dissemination process amongst the three levels of law enforcement. Instead
of taking any law enforcement agent at random, the participants chosen were individuals
who have firsthand experience with the transaction of intelligence amongst different
levels of law enforcement and have experienced the miscommunications and new
implications placed on the distribution of intelligence. Those who were conveniently
accessible and those who could reflect on and provide insight related to their
understanding and involvement with intelligence dissemination were asked to participate.
A recruitment script was used to provide the participant with information about
the interview process (Appendix A). The Script described the objective of the research,
the need for verbal consent in order to participate, the need to record and take notes
throughout the interview, and how long the interview would likely last. There was an
opportunity for participants to ask questions and express concerns after the Script was
read.
Once verbal consent was received, the participants scheduled a time that would
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best fit their schedule for the interview to be conducted. The Institutional Review Board
approved this study, in which, verbal consent allowed for the interview, in some cases, to
be recorded for further documentation later, as well as, acknowledging their ability to
withdraw from the interview at any point in time.
In qualitative research, the sample size has no clear requirement (Hagan, 2018).
When needing information on three different levels of law enforcement, participants from
each level were needed to draw conclusive information from and to further research and
implications.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
Data collection was conducted through unstructured, face-to-face interviews from
an interview schedule that consisted of open-ended questions pertaining to local law
enforcement agencies (See Appendix B) and questions pertaining to state and federal
agencies (See Appendix C). Each level received the same general questions concerning
their particular involvement to facilitate comparisons across interviews (Hagan, 2018).
The interview guide was designed from academic research and the researcher’s prior
knowledge on the subject. Face-to-face interviews allowed the participants to provide
open-ended responses and the opportunity for clarification or expansion while the
interview took place (Hagan, 2018).
The interview schedule contained questions such as, “What current process is
used to share intelligence between police departments and federal agencies in Northern
MS?” In addition, participants were asked questions pertaining to the common
communication obstacles seen amongst the three levels of law enforcement. For instance,
they were asked, “Are there conditions where agencies aren’t allowed to share
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intelligence information?” The relatively unstructured, open-ended, face-to-face
interview offered flexibility in language that potentially increased the quality and length
of the responses.
Each participant was interviewed individually in a private area in order to
maintain confidentiality and were not under influence of other employees. Interviews
were digitally recorded with the interviewee’s permission and then transcribed by the
researcher. On average, the interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Each interview was transcribed by using a semi-strict verbatim style (Typing
Services, 2015), where each and every word of the participants, including all the fillers
(ums, you knows), were included on the transcript. Similarly, participants’ grammatical
errors and misused or mispronounced words were not corrected. Unlike strict verbatim
transcriptions, background noises (doors opening/closing, intercom messages) and nonverbal communication (sighs, laughter, coughs) were not recorded on the transcripts.
Proper nouns were omitted and a generic description of the identifier was placed inside
square brackets. For example, if a participant used a particular area in which they were
employed, the officer’s response would appear on the transcript as, “The federal
government is a tremendous help to the [name of police department].” An additional
attempt to validate the transcripts was made by listening to the digital recording a second
time, while reading the finished transcript. Any errors were corrected.
Data Analysis
Collection and analysis of the qualitative data occurs simultaneously. As
identified by Merriam (1998), coding occurs at two levels: “identifying information about
the data and interpretive constructs related to analysis” (p. 164). For example, each
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interview included identifying notations so that they could be referenced during the
analysis process.
A phenomenological analysis strategy was used to aid the researcher in
understanding the participants’ responses. The first specific technique of a
phenomenological analysis strategy was accomplished through “epoche” (Creswell,
2003, p. 52), the Greek word meaning to “refrain from judgment” (Patton, 1990, p.484).
Merriam (1998) described “epoche” as the process that a researcher employs to try to
view the “phenomenon from several different angles or perspectives” (p. 158).
“Bracketing” (Merriam, 1998, p. 158) or “brackets out” (Patton, 1990, p. 485) is
the second specific technique used to analyze the participants’ experiences. This
analytical process, according to Patton (1990), is a term coined by Husserl in 1913 that
“brackets out the world and presuppositions to identify the data in pure form,
uncontaminated by extraneous intrusions” (p. 485).
Once the data was bracketed, Creswell (2003) suggested the next step of dividing
the collected data in the analysis. Data with equal value were divided into statements.
That is, the data was “horizonalized” (Patton, 1990, p. 486) for examination. The data
was transformed into “clusters of meanings”, as expressed in phenomenological concepts,
or “codes” (Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1998, p. 253). From the various clusters or codes,
the researcher was able to view the participants’ perceptions from differing lenses or
themes.
The subsequent step in the phenomenological analysis involved connecting the
various themes to arrive at a general description of the experience. The descriptions are
presented in both textural and structural approaches. Patton (1990) explained that textural
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descriptions were the participants’ perceptions or an “abstraction of the experience that
provides content and illustration, but not yet essence” (p. 486). Conversely, structural
descriptions explain the real meaning of the experience or the “deeper meanings for the
individuals who, together, make up the group” (Patton, 1990, p. 486). Finally, the
phenomenological analysis concluded with a synthesis of the texture and structure,
“recognizing that a single unifying meaning of the experience exists” (Creswell, 1998, p.
55).
Summary
The purpose of this study was to examine how intelligence is gathered in the
Southern State Region, discover the perceived gaps in the current policies used with this
communication, and provide potential solutions to intelligence communication problems.
The study’s population was chosen through techniques such as non-probability sampling,
purposive sampling, and snowballing. Data was collected through face-to-face
interviews, in which member checking was used in order to find participants. The study
utilized interviews of local police officers, state Fusion center employees, and federal
agents throughout the Southern State Region. Through interviews of participants,
qualitative data was collected and was then transcribed through a semi-strict verbatim
style format. The data was then analyzed to find recurring themes in which the study was
used.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF DATA
INTRODUCTION
Significant amount research has been conducted regarding the
miscommunications among the local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies prior to
September 11, 2001, (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013; Carter, 2009; Rollins, 2008),
and has continued to identify challenges posed with this dissemination after the terrorist
attacks (German & Stanley, 2007; Cozine et al., 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2008). The purpose of this study was to examine how intelligence is gathered in
the Southern State Region, discover real or perceived gaps in the current policies
regulating intelligence sharing communication and provide potential solutions to
intelligence communication problems.
ORGANIZATION OF DATA ANALYSIS
To examine the current practices used to disseminate intelligence among local,
state, and federal law enforcement agencies, structured, face-to-face interviews were
conducted with Southern State Region law enforcement officers. Transcripts from
interviews were gleaned to specifically examine the agency or department’s current
structure of intelligence distribution. The study was guided by the following research
questions:
1) How has intelligence dissemination among local, state, and federal law
enforcement officers changed since September 11, 2001?
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2) What impediments, if any, in intelligence dissemination are perceived by local,
state, and federal law enforcement agents?
Through the process of content analysis, specifically, unrestricted coding, or
“open coding” (Strauss, 1990), the researcher sought to identify patterns, themes, and
common categories. The researcher thoroughly read through each transcript, line-by-line
and word-by-word, in order to establish significant patterns.
PRESENTATION OF DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS
The demographics of the six participants are reported in Table 1. Six participants
were used for this study because of the close geographic proximity to the researcher, ease
of access, and willingness to provide enough information. The researcher began the
selection process by contacting one individual who then began the snowball sampling
process used throughout the study. Ten potential participants were recommended through
snowball sampling. Only six were conveniently available or able to provide adequate
responses to question. The names used in the table represent pseudonyms assigned to
each participant to maintain anonymity.
Among the participants, half (n=3) were employed at the local level. The
remaining three represented the state (n=1) or federal levels (n=2). Among the
participants represented, a police officer, police captain, police investigator, director of
state analysis and information center, FBI analyst, and Department of Justice analyst
were all represented.
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Table I
Interview Participants
Participants

Level of Government

Job Title

John

Local

Police Officer

Charles

Local

Police Captain

Nicholas

Local

Police Investigator

Jessica

State

State Analysis and
Information Center

Heather

Federal

FBI

Patrick

Federal

Department of Justice
Intelligence Analyst

ANALYSIS OF DATA
The two research questions and their corresponding findings are presented
concurrently to facilitate comprehension. As previously stated, both research questions
generated qualitative data. The transcriptions of the interviews were used by the
researcher to draw conclusions.
Research Question 1: How has intelligence dissemination among local, state,
and federal law enforcement officers changed since September 11, 2001?
The first major theme that emerged was that intelligence dissemination has
changed since the attack on September 11, 2001. However, these changes have not
resolved problems that many agencies face when sharing intelligence outside of their
department.
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One of the questions asked to the local level participants was, “What current
process is used to share intelligence between police departments and federal agencies in
the [Southern State Region]?, which was consistent with the state and federal question of,
“How do you currently share intelligence?” The answers to these questions indicated that
the current processes implemented amongst these departments has changed over the past
decade. According to the participants, intelligence dissemination prior to September 11,
2001, was restricted and many organizations were skeptical of its importance. This
speculation is shown with the creation of federal programs that promote intelligence
communication among all levels. One example of change seen since September 11, 2001,
was Heather stated:
One way the FBI now tries to contribute communication and skills to the
public and local or state police officers is provide training through our
Citizen’s Academy and Leaders of the Community programs. They try to
incorporate communication skills as well as making connections between
agencies and departments.
Another example is at the local level, Nicholas proclaimed, “Yeah so now
when we need information on a case, we go to the Fusion Center to get them to
run things like license plates and such through their databases.” Jessica stated,
“Before 9/11, fusion centers didn’t even exist so their existence shows a major
change in policy about communication from the government.”
The first major theme yielded two minor themes related to the first research
question: (a) the use of personal connections as the main source of intelligence
dissemination and (b) the willingness of the federal government to aid local and state law
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enforcement departments.
The first minor theme identified during the interview process was the practice of
using personal communications to disseminate information among levels of law
enforcement. All six interview participants stated they most often used personal
connections to share information with agents outside of their own frequently through
email and phone calls. One participant, Nicholas stated, “For [County] police department,
mostly phone calls and emails are made through our own connections to different
departments located near here, you know.” Another participant, Patrick, said, “My office
uses email almost exclusively...where it comes in as PDF or Excel, depending on current
case and department we get the information from.”
Many participants noted the database, National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), when discussing techniques used to disseminate information outside of their
specific office. NCIC is often used according to all participants but the preferred form of
communication is personal connections through email and phone calls. One participant,
John, explained:
If nothing jumps off of NCIC or there’s not anything on their triple “I”...if
there’s nothing on them and I still think they’re up to no good, my best
point is tag numbers, information from everyone in the car, and then make
phone calls either after the stop or the next day. And sometimes like right
now, you know all of your federal agents are out. So if I thought it was a
narcotics issue, then I might call DEA or [state drug agency] because they
all dip into the same database pretty much. But, they all have a different
clearance. So, if you want something good, you really need to have
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relationships with someone who can pull it for you.
According to all participants, personal communications is often the easiest process to
gain information because of the quick turnaround needed with many law enforcement
stops. For example, John stated:
Our best resource is to have a connection with a local agent. So if I feel
like someone is doing something that is big time, I will just call a buddy at
the FBI and say hey what are your thoughts on this. And then let them run
their checks.
In addition, Heather acknowledged, “Most of what happens in our office is phone calls
from local and state departments about cases in the area that may coincide with us.”
Similarly, Jessica said, “We don’t necessarily get lots of phone calls here but we get
emails to our analysts who then run it through our programs.”
The second minor theme presented was the willingness of the federal government
to aid in the local and state criminal cases when asked. Many participants stated that the
federal government was more than willing to help whenever asked by requested a local or
state level law enforcement department. For example, Heather stated, “Most definitely.
The headquarters recommends, uh, our communication with other, uh, agencies and law
enforcement. This is a very big thing from headquarters. It is extremely encouraged.”
Another participant, Charles, explained, “The feds are real good at moving information in
order to help solve our cases. The state, not so much. Feds help whenever they’re
needed.”
Since the federal levels are willing to help, two main areas are used in order to aid
local and state law enforcement officers in the forms of: (a) fusion centers and (b) task
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forces. Jessica described fusion centers’ makeup as:
Well here in [the Southern State Region], the fusion centers [have]
individuals from all three levels of law enforcement. We have multiple
local police departments , there is a Capitol police, FBI analyst, Homeland
Security investigator, TSA agent, department of health agent, Attorney
General's representative, etc. all working together in the same office in
order to better communicate information to the requests coming in here.
The communication between levels of law enforcement not only occurs through
state affiliation, but includes the federal level. For example, Heather stated, “Most
intelligence sharing is done through our JTTFs which are made up of police departments
that work with our federal agents.”
Research Question 2: What impediments, if any, in intelligence dissemination are
perceived by local, state, and federal law enforcement agents?
According to the findings, miscommunications exist among the three levels of law
enforcement. The themes that emerged in this regard include (a) many law enforcement
departments are overwhelmed with information and are unfamiliar with the resources
through the fusion center; (b) different systems used throughout law enforcement
departments cause a technological issue; and (c) the slow process of declassification and
a “need to know” hinder the communication process.
Many Law Enforcement Departments are overwhelmed with Information and Lack
Knowledge of Available Resources
According to participants, the overwhelming amount of information law
enforcement agencies possess hinders intelligence dissemination. Heather stated, “Many
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agencies are swamped with information that takes a while to process. This hinders the
sharing process outside their organization.”
As a result of the information overload, many departments are unaware of
assistance from fusion centers in their area. The knowledge of the fusion centers in the
Southern State Region are not widely publicized. Jenny stated:
Yes, there are many issues with departments in our region not realizing
our existence. Since the [Southern State Region] is such a rural area, many
local departments, for sure, don’t really know that a fusion center exists in
their own state. Therefore, the resources we can, uh, provide them is often
not used.
Different Systems used throughout Law Enforcement Departments cause a
Technological Issue
Most participants explained technological issues were present in the Southern
State Region. The majority of participants stated that most law enforcement departments
use different technological databases. Patrick stated,
The technological issues we tend to run into is the fact that many
databases aren’t the same between departments. Then there’s the issue of
large files being transferred that are hard to download or to encrypt in
order to email to another individual. Yea, and then encryption has gotten
huge, so that takes a whole ‘nother process of sending information.
In addition, John revealed the following about the local level:
Local law enforcement, outside of your county, it is very rare to have the
same computer system. So we go to [county], they have a different
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computer system. And that’s where the federal government has an up on
local law enforcement. All of the DEA will bleed into this one system, this
one server. All of the FBI will have one. And the ATF the same. Ours,
however, will not unless it’s the same company. So it’s a money making
issues where our system may cost too much for [county] PD who has 5
officers. [County] can afford something that we can’t.
Re-emphasizing this fact, Charles also stated, “There are many different databases
over our area of [Southern State Region] which causes lots of issues.”
Slow Process of Declassification and “Need-to-Know” hinder
Communication Process
The participants noted the burden of declassification and the policy of
“need to know” among law enforcement levels. When information is
disseminated from the federal level to the state level, there is a requirement for
declassification of documents with “secret” or “top secret” classifications. For
example, the federal level was asked, “Are there conditions where agencies aren’t
allowed to share intelligence information? (ex: sensitive trial, etc.),” Heather
answered, “There are cases where declassification comes into play. This happens
fairly often and it, um, takes a while for things to be declassified.”
Most participants identified problems associated with the “need to know”
policy, where information cannot be passed to another agency without an actual
need for the information. In that regard, Jessica stated, “There are instances where
we have to run case numbers in our systems, but aren’t given the reason why or
what for cause we don’t have a need to know for that information.”
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SUMMARY
In this chapter, the demographics of the six participants were reported. The
findings of the qualitative study were also reported by presenting the responses related to
each research question.
The first major theme, relating to the first research question, stated that
intelligence dissemination has changed since the attack on September 11, 2001. Two
minor themes were identified related to the research question. These minor themes were
(a) the idea of using personal communications amongst levels of law enforcement in
order to disseminate information and (b) the willingness of the federal government to aid
in local and state criminal cases whenever they are asked.
Responses to the second research question revealed that there are communication
problems associated with the dissemination of intelligence among the three levels of law
enforcement. The minor themes that emerged were (a) many law enforcement
departments are overwhelmed with information and are unaware of the resources
available through the fusion center, (b) different systems used throughout law
enforcement departments cause a technological issue, and (c) the slow process of
declassification and a “need to know” hinder the communication process.
In Chapter Five, the conclusions drawn from the preceding findings are presented.
The discussion of these conclusions will include a comparison of how these findings
compare to previous studies. After the conclusions are presented, the implications for
future research and practice will be detailed.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the conclusions drawn from the
findings detailed in the previous chapter. Initially, the conclusions will be discussed
relative to the existing research presented in Chapter Two. Implications for future
research will be detailed as well as implications for future practice. Finally, a summary of
the chapter will be provided.
CONCLUSIONS
Drawing from previous research related to intelligence dissemination surrounding
September 11, 2001, there was an obvious lack of communication amongst the three
levels of law enforcement that contributed to the September 11 attacks (Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2013; Carter, 2009; Dodson, 2007; German, & Stanley, 2007; Rollins, 2008;
Council of State, 2005). Previous research has also shown that the implementation of
fusion centers and widespread use of personal connections between organizations have
been transformed in order to better communication among law enforcement levels in the
future (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2013; Carter, 2009; Cozine et al., 2014; Jenkins,
Liepman, Willis, 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).
Fusion centers embody the process of intelligence communication among the
three levels of law enforcement. Overwhelmingly, studies have found that fusion centers
provided a specific location for each actor to communicate intelligence outside of their
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particular office (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). Past research has also
specifically shown there are still actions needed to better implement intelligence
dissemination throughout law enforcement (German, M., & Stanley, J; Jenkins, B. M.,
Liepman, A., & Willis, H. H., 2014; Rollins, J., 2008).
The findings from the current study are consistent with prior research in several
ways. First, the present need for intelligence communication among the three levels of
law enforcement remains critical. Every participant stated that communication outside of
their particular agency was critical to their daily work. The first major theme detailed in
the findings was that participants had a varied perception on how intelligence
dissemination has been recommended and to what extent in recent years. According to
Carter’s (2009) article, in the fifteen years since the September 11, 2001 attack, the
government encouraged cooperative relationships among levels of law enforcement.
However, according to German and Stanley’s (2007) article, intelligence sharing is
indeed needed as long as its implementation does not impose on the citizen’s rights and
information is handled with the utmost care. There are still gaps in intelligence
dissemination that need to be addressed.
The current study supports assertions made by Carter (2009) and German and
Stanley (2007). Many of the interview participants stated the overall need to
communicate intelligence outside of their agency has increased. The first and second
major themes applicably supported the first research question because they identified two
aspects in which communication is accomplished. The first exemplifies the
communication aspect of personal connections amongst different agencies and levels of
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law enforcement through the situations described by Nicholas with personal phone calls
and Patrick with emails. The second discusses the willingness of the federal level to
communicate intelligence to state and local law enforcement departments through
Heather and Charles's responses about the federal level encouraging them to
communicate with other organizations. Participants who used personal connections in
order to disseminate intelligence stated that it was the easiest way to broadcast
information to outside agencies. Participants who did not utilize personal connections,
but opted to use request forms, failed to realize the rapid response that personal
connections provide. Personal connections and government willingness allows for better
intelligence communication by promoting communication outside their specific
organization.
Themes three, four and five exemplified German and Stanley’s (2007) proposal
for further intelligence dissemination. The third theme indicates the overwhelming
amount of information local law enforcement departments receive and cannot maintain.
The local departments lack knowledge of fusion center resources that could potentially
help them discover pertinent information. This was evident throughout the interviews
from all levels of law enforcement: (a) Heather at the federal level stating that local
counterparts were not able to disseminate information efficiently with the overwhelming
amount they possessed, and (b) Jenny at state level stating the local’s lack of knowledge
of their fusion center capabilities. The knowledge of fusion center capabilities to aid
intelligence dissemination and resource opportunities is very unknown through the
information obtained in the interviews.
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This lack of communication was also evident in the fourth theme’s implication of
technological issues between law enforcement databases. The local law enforcement
databases in the Southern State Region vary among counties and the communications
amongst departments are often delayed. According to Cozine, Joyal, and Ors (2014),
fusion centers were designed and implemented to mend the gap among local, state, and
federal law enforcement agencies as well as those on the same governmental level.
Therefore, knowledge of the fusion center throughout the state should aid intelligence
dissemination.
The fifth theme revealed that there is a slow declassification process and a “need
to know” when it comes to the intelligence sharing while protecting citizen’s rights and
the integrity of the information. Several participants mentioned the declassification
process and the “need to know” as an impediment to sharing intelligence. According to
Rollins (2008), there are many complexities when it comes to the declassification process
or when information is “over-classified” in order to protect the information.
Unfortunately, it hinders the information from reaching appropriate personnel working
outside of the agency. Many participants expounded upon these implications. Heather
stated declassification often takes a while to complete and is a problem with many cases.
While Jessica stated “need to know” is often seen in her work when she runs information
on an individual without given the full context of the case.
The findings from this study indicate that intelligence dissemination among the
three levels of law enforcement is remains critical, but improvements are still needed.
Specifically, intelligence dissemination has become a tremendous aspect of the
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participant’s daily activities. The law enforcement community’s encouragement for
communication among all levels of law enforcement continues to be a focal point in each
organization. While supporting the existing literature, these findings also provide
implications for future research and practice.
Implications for Future Research
There are several ways in which future research could improve upon and expand
the current study. One method used for ensuring validity in qualitative research is known
as member
checking. Member checking is when, “the researcher solicits participants’ views of the
credibility of the findings and interpretations” (Creswell, 2013, p. 252). Lincoln and
Guba (1985)
refer to member checking as “the most critical technique for establishing credibility” (p.
314). While member checking was done to an extent in this study, with the constraints of
the available participants, more qualified members could have potentially been
available.Another strategy for ensuring validity is by using triangulation. Triangulation is
when, “researchers make use of multiple and different sources, methods, investigators,
and theories toprovide corroborating evidence” (Creswell, 2013, p. 251). Future research
of the intelligence dissemination process between the three levels of law enforcement
could employ a national focus group participants to review their initial analyses on
intelligence dissemination across law enforcement levels and provide suggestions on
what is lacking or future recommendations.
Although much of past research into intelligence dissemination among levels of
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law enforcement has been qualitative in a sense, these studies do not contribute a widerange of perspectives on the topic. The use of surveys could broaden the scope.
Triangulating methods would allow for the findings from each method to support one
another and would strengthen any findings from the study.
One topic in the current study that needs further analysis is the reasoning behind
the difficulty of dissemination intelligence. After years of trying to make communication
a focal point of the law enforcement intelligence community, there has to be a reason
why barriers still exist when some obstacles have been identified. Recommendations to
better communication are seen in past research (Carter, 2009; German & Stanley, 2007;
Rollins, 2008), but no reasonable explanation for communication hardships was
articulated nor was an actionable plan proposed.
Last, additional studies need to be conducted. A study consisting of a larger
sample size should be implemented to acquire numerous perspectives. A larger sample
increased the potential to reach employees from other levels of law enforcement thus
potentially broadening the information. The larger sample size helps promote
generalizability. Another recommendation for future studies is a replication of the current
study throughout other regions of the country. Incorporating other regions allow for
comparisons from other regions to the Southern State Region, as well as allowing for new
themes to emerge.

Implications for Practice
In addition to the implications for future research, practical implications can be
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drawn from the current study. The first implication is related to the personal connections.
A keyword database should be created for each classification level. If a database of case
information were kept, such as name, telephone numbers, identifying factors such as eye
color or hair color, height, age, case agent, gang affiliation, etc., then this data could be
examined by all employees in the agency and even future employees. An interagency
database would bring together law enforcement departments from the three levels of law
enforcement and help modify the intelligence sharing process (Carter, 2009). Since
September 11, 2001, communications between agencies has increased and is encouraged
but no one has created a calculated system to keep communications current and withstand
organizational changes. This data could provide the agency with greater outside
connections and there would potentially never be a lull in intelligence sharing. Creating
this database will not be easy, but it could provide the agents better access to external
employees who potentially have knowledge of their subject.
Another implication that could aid intelligence communication is a federal open
house. At this open house, local and state law enforcement officers would be invited into
the federal agency in order to begin communication and connection-making. The federal
level could provide the local and state level with an understanding of their capabilities
and resources while explaining their ways of aiding in the future. The local and state level
could then realize the federal’s capabilities and would know for future reference on
upcoming cases. Also, connections among the levels could be built as interactions are
made in this open house. The open house allows for easy communication because all
levels are present.
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The local level’s lack of knowledge of fusion centers is a problem with
intelligence dissemination. If knowledge of fusion centers’ capabilities were known, then
future intelligence dissemination would exceed current standings through the aspect of a
centralized organization. The betterment of publicization of fusion centers is key to
centralizing the intelligence communication. Local level’s use of fusion centers can help
the increase in communication among levels of law enforcement. Therefore, fusion
centers need to send out publications of their existence, information, and capabilities to
organizations in their region to ensure they have knowledge of their existence. This can
be achieved through emails, phone calls, visits to the local departments, participating in
police chief conferences, flyers, and expanding fusion center employee opportunities to
all local departments.
Summary
The problem addressed in this study was the changes in intelligence dissemination
since September 11, 2001, how effective it has been, and what gaps are still in effect. The
review of literature showed that there have been numerous laws put into effect since
September 11, 2001, such as the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan or the 9/11
Commission Report. The research also provided that despite the critical focus on
intelligence dissemination there are still numerous situations in which intelligence
dissemination is faltering. This evidence was mainly presented through qualitative studies
which used personal statements from individuals involved in organizations at the federal
level of law enforcement and governmental leaders. These studies did not provide many
insights into the local or state level individuals who are affected by the communication
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change at a different angle.
The purpose of this study is to examine how intelligence is gathered in the
Southern State Region, discover the perceived gaps in the current policies and practices
used with this communication and provide potential solutions to intelligence
communication. Through interviews, local, state, and federal law enforcement employees
provided information on current communication techniques such as personal connections
through phone calls or emails and explained the benefits of fusion centers in improving
connections. The study discovered barriers in lack of awareness of fusion centers,
different databases used in the local level, and the slow process of declassification or
hindrance of “need to know.”
The problem of fusion center awareness throughout the Southern State Region
still exists to an extent, but is being dealt with under new supervision through community
outreach and attending programs such as the Chiefs of Police. Databases throughout the
region are different because of the varying amount of resources departments have to
spend on their systems. Bigger towns have a larger budget to buy a nicer database rather
than the tiny towns throughout the region that do not have the same budget. This problem
will not be solved until databases are not priced drastically different or a law goes into
effect to mandate a unified system throughout the region. Declassification and “need to
know” are issues that could potentially be permanent problems with intelligence
dissemination. The protection of intelligence is mandatory, therefore validating these two
problems.
The findings from the present study indicate that intelligence dissemination has
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improved and will continued to improve in the future with the use of personal
communications. There are still obstacles to be changed in order to continue improving
communication, but intelligence dissemination has made progress since September 11,
2001.
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APPENDIX A
RECRUITMENT SCRIPT
Thank you for allowing me to briefly speak to you during your working hours. I
am a student at the University of Mississippi and would like your assistance with a
research project regarding intelligence dissemination amongst local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies and what gaps, if any, are seen in this process. My objective is to
learn how the September 11, 2001 attacks changed communication techniques amongst
these three levels of law enforcement and if the changes have been successful in helping
intelligence dissemination.
Your participation in an interview is completely voluntary. If you agree to
participate we ask you to give verbal consent. Then, we will set up a time to conduct the
interview that is convenient to your working schedule. I will record and take notes during
the interview under your discretion. Finally, the information obtained through the
interview will be transcribed in order to analyze and conduct further research.
Your participation in the interview will be completely anonymous outside myself
and my thesis advisor. Only the information given will be presented in the research. It
should take about 30 minutes to complete the interview. There is no direct benefit for you
participating. However, important information from this interview could potentially
benefit future intelligence dissemination in North Mississippi.
Do you have any questions?
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APPENDIX B
LOCAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1.

What current process is used to share intelligence between police

departments and federal agencies in Northern MS?
2.

Are there gaps you have seen in intelligence sharing?

3.

Do you have an assigned person to coordinate information sharing with

other police departments or federal agencies that work in Northern MS?
4.

Does lack money and personnel hinder the process of sharing intelligence

with law enforcement?
5.

Has information from federal agencies helped solve previous cases?

6.

How does this department receive intelligence from federal agencies

located in Northern MS?
7.

Is there a shared database that local law enforcement can see information

on or add information to?
8.

How often is this database used in this department to solve cases?

9.

How accessible are these databases to this department?

10. Has data you provided to these databases helped other police departments
solve cases?

62

APPENDIX C
STATE AND FEDERAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1.

Who does intelligence for North MS law enforcement community?

2.

How do you currently share intelligence?

3.

Who do you coordinate intelligence with currently?

4.

Is there a formal process used to share intelligence or is it simply knowing

people and sharing information?
5.

Are there gaps that you’ve seen in intelligence sharing?

6.

How do you work with local law enforcement?

7.

Does lack money and personnel hinder the process of sharing intelligence

with law enforcement?
8.

How do you receive intelligence from local law enforcement?

9.

Do national agencies support the sharing of intelligence locally?

10. If so, do national agencies provide resources to help sharing intelligence
locally?
11. Are there conditions where agencies aren’t allowed to share intelligence
information? (ex: sensitive trial, etc.)
12. Are there any shared databases between federal agencies?
13. Is there a shared database that local law enforcement can add information to?
14. Is there a shared database that local law enforcement can see information on?
15. Are there problems with coordinating databases between agencies?
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